digital sovereignty · eu · bulgaria · the cloud act · japan · 41 min read

The Cloud: What Is Digital Sovereignty?

Humanity has fought for centuries over who rules the land, and arguably has not finished. The same question is now being asked of The Cloud, faster and with fewer rules.

The Cloud: What Is Digital Sovereignty?
Table of contents

Introduction

It began as a question about privacy: which messaging app to trust. It turned into a question of sovereignty. Privacy asks who can see your personal data. Sovereignty asks who legally controls the tech systems a state runs on: the servers its ministries use, the software its banks depend on, and the switch that can turn them off.

In 2015, in an interview with Edward Snowden for Last Week Tonight, host John Oliver demonstrated how people could not grasp “global mass surveillance” in the abstract until it was translated into “someone could see your dick pics”. Even Snowden, in exile, smiled on camera.

“Digital sovereignty” has the same translation problem: to most people it sounds like a political issue with no practical implication for them. Yet who controls the systems that run both your personal life and your government, technically and legally, is a very practical matter. In July 2024, a faulty update from a single American security company, CrowdStrike, crashed millions of Windows computers worldwide: flights were grounded, hospitals postponed operations, and shops and banks could not take payments. That was an accident. Imagine the same thing as a decision.

The keys to much of the world’s encrypted data, national data included, are held by the largest cloud providers: AWS (Amazon), Google Cloud and Azure (Microsoft), the so-called US hyperscalers. All are subject to the US CLOUD Act of 2018, the law that can force American-registered tech companies to hand over user data to the US government, even if their client is a foreign government or foreign-registered business, regardless of where the servers are physically located.

Every country that runs on The Cloud is exposed to the same law. This series looks at how four parts of the world cope with it: the European Union, Russia, Bulgaria and Japan. Side by side, they show how differently “sovereignty” can be interpreted, and what each approach costs.

What Is a Cloud?

Most of us think we run software. In reality it is the other way around: software runs us.

Your banking app, your school platform, your doctor’s booking system: all of it lives in a cloud and changes while you sleep. A cloud is often pictured as a warehouse of computers where data is stored, or a shop renting digital tools. However, today it is better understood as an environment where software is being developed, run and changed without pause. Most software is now created the “agile” way: in small pieces, released often, sometimes several times a day, and adjusted as it goes. Developers assemble it from the cloud provider’s ready-made building blocks, such as databases, login systems and AI models, so it often cannot run anywhere else.

A government whose systems are built from one provider’s building blocks cannot simply pack up and leave; its software would have to be rebuilt from scratch. This is called lock-in. The provider never leaves the room, either: it keeps changing those building blocks from outside.

The Cloud is also where artificial intelligence is grown into systems even their makers cannot fully explain. In June 2026, Anthropic’s leaders estimated that Claude writes at least 90% of its own code, and warned that AI building AI could soon outpace human checking.

The loop is closing on itself. Ask such an AI how it works, as we asked Claude while writing this series, and it will tell you it cannot see inside itself. That sounds like evasion at first glance, but the human condition is the same: your brain was shaped by your parents, your culture, your education and a lifetime of experience, and yet you cannot observe how it is wired. An AI is in the same position. No one can read what training made of it, not its makers and not the AI itself.

This is where the cloud stops being a technical matter. Software does not just serve institutions; it changes them. In Australia, between 2016 and 2019, an automated system wrongly accused hundreds of thousands of people of having received too much in welfare benefits, and demanded the money back. People had to prove their innocence to a machine. The scheme, known as Robodebt, ended in a settlement of about 1.8 billion Australian dollars. Nobody had voted to change how the welfare system treated its citizens. The software had changed it.

Digital life changes relationships too. Finding a care worker for an elderly parent or a child once went through referrals. Now it most often goes through online star ratings. A domestic worker who is mistreated may put up with it, fearing a bad review. Trust has been replaced by algorithmic management: a number on an app, controlled by the platform. That number can be manipulated or faked.

The same kind of software dependence reaches ministries, hospitals and armies, which now speak of “software-defined defense”. So the question is not where your data is stored. It is who runs the software that runs you.

The European Union

Why Can’t Europe Just Use a European Cloud?

Because the server’s location is not what counts. The CLOUD Act follows the nationality of the tech company, not where its servers stand: if AWS runs a data center in Frankfurt, a US court can still order AWS to hand over the data stored there. Whatever the GDPR says, “EU servers” from an American provider do not bring legal sovereignty.

Doesn’t European Law Protect European Data?

Not against this. The EU’s data protection law, the GDPR, and the CLOUD Act contradict each other. The CLOUD Act says an American company must hand over data a US court demands. The GDPR says a foreign court order alone is not enough; that takes an international agreement, which the EU and the US have not concluded. A company served with such an order breaks one law whichever way it turns. The GDPR can only punish it afterwards, with fines of up to 4% of its global turnover. In practice, the fines are much lower. Also, a fine does not bring the data back.

The CLOUD Act is also only part of the exposure. It covers demands from US police and courts. American intelligence agencies reach data through a different law, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is what EU courts have objected to most.

What about “Sovereign” Clouds from American Companies?

Under pressure, Amazon, Microsoft and Google now sell European “sovereign” versions of their clouds. Typically, the data stays in the EU, the service is run by staff living in the EU, and it sits in a separate European subsidiary. None of this removes the CLOUD Act: as long as the American parent controls the subsidiary, a US court can order it to hand over data.

Microsoft has effectively admitted it. In 2025, asked under oath by the French Senate whether it could guarantee that French data would never be handed to US authorities, its French legal director said it could not. Governments are buying it anyway: the European alternatives are smaller, moving away is expensive, and the “sovereign” label gives officials something to point to when asked whether the country’s data is safe. “Sovereign”, in other words, is a marketing word. The CLOUD Act does not read marketing.

Only two things truly change the picture. The first is encryption keys held by the customer alone: if the tech provider cannot decrypt the data, a court order gets nothing but scrambled data. The second is a European company legally in charge. France has gone furthest: Bleu, owned by Orange and Capgemini, and S3NS, controlled by Thales, run Microsoft’s and Google’s technology under license, but as French companies, out of reach of US courts.

Why Don’t Europeans Simply Switch to European Providers?

Because the American providers have a head start:

Scale: The hyperscalers run hundreds of data centers around the world. A messaging app has to respond instantly wherever its users are, and European clouds have few data centers outside Europe, so a user in Brazil or Southeast Asia would wait longer for every message.

  • Ready-made building blocks: AWS and Google Cloud offer dozens of well-tested services, such as databases, security tools and systems that manage traffic, which a startup can use instead of building its own. European providers offer fewer, so their customers need more engineers to build the rest.
  • Skilled workers: Most engineers learned their trade on American clouds, so companies that use them hire faster and spend less on training.
  • Cost and reliability: Their size lets the hyperscalers spread costs over millions of customers, which keeps prices down. A smaller provider cannot match those prices, or that reliability, without enormous investment.
  • Lock-in: Once a company has built on AWS, moving away means rebuilding much of its software.

European clouds are not incapable. OVHcloud, Scaleway and Deutsche Telekom’s offerings are real, built for EU rules from the start, and growing. They lag behind the hyperscalers in global reach, range of services and experience.

That gap is what Gaia-X was meant to close. Until it does, many “sovereign” European apps will keep depending on American cloud plumbing underneath their European-branded front end.

How Far Along Is Gaia-X?

Gaia-X was launched in October 2019 by the French and German economic ministries, as Europe’s answer to its dependence on American clouds. The original plan promised operating prototype services by 2021.

It never became an actual cloud. Building a cloud means constructing data centers, filling them with servers, and selling the services built on them. Gaia-X did none of that. Instead, it built a set of rules for what counts as a “trustworthy, sovereign, GDPR-compliant” cloud service, with a certification that works like a stamp of approval.

So what is the point? The stamp can work as a filter. Gaia-X’s highest level goes only to providers headquartered in Europe, beyond the reach of American courts. If governments buy only from clouds that carry the stamp, the CLOUD Act is shut out. If they don’t, the stamp is just a sticker.

Certifying clouds instead of building one is a slower path to visible results. A cloud is something people can point to and use. A certification succeeds only if others choose to get certified: it does not create a product, it hopes to steer a market that already exists.

By 2023, Gaia-X was stuck in bureaucracy, national infighting and vague objectives. It had to invite the very hyperscalers it was meant to counter into the project, because European industry still depends on them, and some founding members left in protest.

The market did not wait. While Gaia-X was still building bureaucracies and PowerPoint presentations, European providers went ahead with their own clouds, and the hyperscalers with their marketing-label “sovereign” versions.

Gaia-X has grown since: by late 2025, 600 cloud services from 15 providers, such as online storage and rented servers, none of them Gaia-X’s own, carried its stamp and were listed in its catalog. Even so, its own leadership now concedes the hyperscalers will keep the lion’s share of the market. In 2025, its CEO, Ulrich Ahle, said 90% of cloud use can be served by the American providers, under Gaia-X’s lower levels. Only its top level, for critical infrastructure, defense and similarly sensitive uses, roughly a tenth of the market, is reserved for European-owned providers. That is a much narrower ambition than the original promise of a “sovereign alternative to Big Tech”.

Nobody is barred from the European clouds; any company or citizen can sign up with STACKIT or OVHcloud tomorrow. The tenth is Gaia-X’s estimate of where sovereignty is needed. For everything else, it expects customers to choose the hyperscalers, because they are cheaper and offer more. Sovereignty, in this view, is something only the state requires; everyone else’s data is left to the market.

What is taking shape instead of one “European AWS” is a patchwork: Germany’s STACKIT, backed by an €11 billion data center investment in Lübbenau from Lidl’s owner, the Schwarz Group; France’s OVHcloud, based in Roubaix; the hyperscalers’ “sovereign” clouds, with Gaia-X’s certification on top of all of it.

Either way, Europe had better hurry. The sanctions that cut Russia off could one day be turned on Europe, and not only in the cloud: in banking too.

Russia: Sovereignty as State Control

Russia has solved its CLOUD Act problem, but not in a way Europe could copy. Where the EU means protecting citizens’ data from outside access, Russia means state control of the networks, the servers and the apps: it builds domestic replacements, then pushes people into them by blocking the foreign ones. This is closer to digital isolation than to sovereignty in the European sense.

It started with a 2015 law (242-FZ) requiring Russians’ personal data, such as names, phone numbers and messages, to be stored on servers inside Russia, within reach of the security services. The point was not to keep foreign governments out, but to let the Russian state in. LinkedIn, with a small Russian user base, refused and was blocked in 2016.

In 2019 came the “Sovereign Internet” law, which gave the state the legal and technical means to disconnect the Russian internet from the rest of the world. Moscow presented it as protection: if the US ever cut Russia off, the Russian internet would keep running. In practice, it gave the state control over what Russians can reach.

The law has since matured into a working control system. The state censor, Roskomnadzor, has installed filtering equipment on internet providers’ networks, letting it block or slow traffic centrally instead of relying on each provider to enforce bans. The same law created a national Domain Name System (DNS), the directory that tells computers where to find each website. In February 2026, YouTube, Facebook and major foreign news sites were removed from it, so users relying on it are told those sites do not exist.

A Domestic Cloud

Russia does not run on the US hyperscalers. They were never dominant there, and after 2022 they largely stopped selling new services in the country. The switch was essentially complete by 2025: foreign providers now hold only a tiny share of the market.

The market is led by national tech and telecom champions rather than independent cloud companies. The largest is Cloud.ru, the cloud arm of the state-controlled bank Sber, with about a third of the market. VK Cloud belongs to VK, formerly Mail.ru, the same group that develops the Max messenger.

Russia didn’t build this to answer the CLOUD Act; keeping the Americans out is a side effect. The result is that Russian data is legally and physically held by Russian companies: out of reach of American courts, and within reach of Russian security services.

The firms that run Russia’s clouds are Russian; the hardware inside them is not. The processors are mostly American, from Intel, AMD and, for AI, Nvidia, now brought in through third countries, while more and more of the servers and network equipment come from China. If those supply routes close, Russia’s clouds cannot grow.

Replacing the Messengers

On top of that infrastructure, the state has moved against foreign communication apps step by step, partly on the grounds that they did not store Russian users’ data inside Russia, as the 2015 law requires. Signal and Viber were blocked in 2024. The following year, Telegram was restricted. In February 2026, WhatsApp, used by about 100 million Russians, was blocked, and the authorities pointed Russians to Max instead. WhatsApp called it a “state-owned surveillance app”.

Max is the state-backed replacement. Developed by VK, itself under state influence, it launched in 2025 and was promoted as Russia’s “national messenger”. It combines messaging with access to government services, such as proving your identity online. Since 1 September 2025, Max must be pre-installed on every smartphone and tablet sold in Russia; Moscow schools were told to switch to it.

Max is not privacy-preserving. It is subject to Russian law, and lawyers caution that its data is accessible to the security services. Uptake has been driven largely by pressure: by October 2026, VK reported 140 million registered users, pushed across by the blocks.

Closing the Exits

VPNs, apps that route a user’s internet traffic through another country, are the main way around the blocks, so they are the next target. By January 2026, Roskomnadzor had blocked 439 VPN services. The same filtering equipment that enforces the blocks disrupts VPN connections. The law closes in from the other side: advertising VPNs is banned—since 2025, using one to break the law makes the offense worse in the eyes of the court.

EU and Russia: Two Meanings of Sovereignty

Russia’s sovereignty means state control, achieved through home-grown companies, bans and surveillance. The EU’s stated aim is the opposite: protection from overreach by both foreign and domestic governments, pursued through encryption, open-source software that anyone can inspect, independent infrastructure and projects like Gaia-X. It is trying to achieve both independence and privacy at the same time, which is much harder. At first glance it is tempting to admire Russia’s efficiency with this, until you consider that a single seat of authority moves faster than a democracy where many have to agree. Each has its price: in Russia it is privacy; in Europe it is dependence on US tech, and some privacy by extension, through the CLOUD Act.

Privacy Is Not the Same as Sovereignty

The cautionary tale for Europe is not that it could become authoritarian like Russia, but that it could end up cut off like Russia. In 2022, Russia lost Western cloud services, the Visa and Mastercard networks and, for major banks, access to the SWIFT payment messaging network. About 300 billion dollars of its central bank reserves held abroad were, and still remain, frozen. It weathered the shock partly because it had spent years building fallbacks: domestic clouds; Mir, its own answer to Visa and Mastercard, created after the 2014 sanctions; and its own alternative to SWIFT.

Europe’s dependence on the US cloud is not just a privacy problem under the CLOUD Act. It is a sanctions risk. A US administration in conflict with the European Union could switch off services that European institutions rely on. Sanctions work by controlling infrastructure: the currency, the payment routes, and increasingly the cloud. Much of Europe’s digital infrastructure is American. Europe is far less prepared than Russia.

Between 2004 and 2012, the French bank BNP Paribas serviced clients in Sudan, Iran and Cuba, countries under US sanctions. In 2014 it had little choice but to plead guilty, pay a fine of almost 9 billion dollars and accept a one-year ban on some dollar transactions. The alternative was being cut off from the dollar entirely, which would have shut one of Europe’s biggest banks out of international finance. How? Because every dollar payment passes through banks in the United States, under US federal jurisdiction. The cloud works the same way: after the US sanctioned the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, in 2025, he reportedly lost access to his Microsoft email account and had to move to the Swiss provider Proton, and his bank accounts were frozen.

Bulgaria: The Google Security Project / България

За превод на български: копирайте указанията по-долу в чата на bggpt.ai и ги изпратете. В следващото съобщение поставете текста на желаните раздели. Препоръчвам също Introduction, What Is a Cloud? и Conclusion.

I will paste an opinion article in English. Translate it into Bulgarian as a columnist would write it. Keep the author’s voice and irony; do not soften, flatten or summarize.


The Bulgarian state has handed the watch over its ministries’ and agencies’ computer systems to Google. Under a project officially called the National Cybersecurity System, with no published cost, 54 government institutions are being connected to a central security control room run on Google’s technology. The public learned of it not from the government but from a Google press release.

In December 2024, the American Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), whose job is to win contracts for American companies abroad, granted Information Services, a Bulgarian state-owned IT company, close to 1.4 million dollars to plan the “National Cybersecurity Operations Center”, on condition that the plan name American suppliers. The subjugation of the Bulgarian ministries’ digital defenses to the American state was baked in from the start.

“Information Services” has been plugging the institutions into Google’s system since early 2026. Each one now sends its security records to Google’s cloud, where Google’s software checks them against Google’s own list of known hacking groups, including those working for foreign governments. What counts as a threat to the Bulgarian state, and how to respond, now depends largely on a foreign company subject to the US CLOUD Act, the American law that lets US authorities demand data from American companies wherever in the world it is stored.

These records don’t contain the ministries’ documents per se, but they hand Google something more sensitive: a map of which of the state’s systems are vulnerable, and which officials have access to them. It is exactly what any foreign intelligence service would want. With it, one can cripple the ministries in a crisis or pick out the officials worth pressuring. Once the state’s defenses run on Google’s system, leaving means rebuilding them from scratch.

That map sits on the servers of an American company. Under the CLOUD Act, American authorities can demand it. Bulgaria has not said who holds the encryption keys.

A system meant to protect Bulgaria’s digital sovereignty hands a large part of it to a single foreign company.

Who Is Responsible?

The agreement that set this project in motion was signed on December 13, 2024, by Ivaylo Filipov, head of Information Services, and the director of the American Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), a US government agency. The head of Bulgaria’s interim government, Dimitar Glavchev, and the e-Government Minister, Valentin Mundrov, attended the ceremony. What it would mean for the state was never explained to the public. The Google system that followed was presented by Simeon Kartselyanski, the security engineer who heads the control room at Information Services. According to his own Linkedin profile, from January 2024 to February 2026 he was the National Cyber Security Coordinator, the state official charged with overseeing Bulgaria’s cyber defense. During those same two years, he was also chief of information security at Information Services, a company that answers to its board and its contracts, not to a minister and parliament. He has held the company post since 2022 and still holds it today: the official who oversaw the system also ran it.

This is the legal gap: Bulgarian law gives cyber defense to state bodies; here a decision of state was taken with a company’s signature. As with the price, the legal levers used to bring the 54 institutions on board have never been made public.

Glavchev, meanwhile, has returned to his previous post as head of the National Audit Office, the body that checks how state money is spent, and the one that would be expected to scrutinize an arrangement like this.

What Does It Cost?

Neither the Bulgarian government nor the “Information Services” firm has published a price, so we estimated one, based on market prices for similar systems. These are estimates.

The bill consists of three parts. The first is Cybershield, Google’s security package for governments. Its core software, Google Security Operations, collects the security records of all 54 institutions and scans them in real time for signs of intrusion. Google rents it rather than sells it, charging a yearly fee based on the size of the organization: for a state administration of this scale, about €1.75 million a year.

Then the software checks those records against Google Threat Intelligence, the second component of the bill: a database of known hacking groups. Many of these groups, the teams behind major cyber attacks, work for the intelligence services of other countries. When a record from a Bulgarian ministry matches a known group’s tools, the system raises a flag. The database is built largely on Mandiant, an American cybersecurity firm Google bought in 2022 for 5.4 billion dollars. Access to it costs about €1 million a year.

The third component is connecting the 54 separate institutions to the system: a one-time fee of about €2 million. Over three years, the usual minimum for such contracts, the three parts add up to about €10 million.

The same result can be achieved with open-source software, which is free of charge and open for anyone to inspect. A program called Wazuh, for example, can collect the security records from every computer in the 54 institutions and flag suspicious activity, running on the state’s own servers. Another, MISP, is used by NATO and by national cyber-response teams across Europe to share warnings: when one ministry spots a hacking group’s traces, every other institution, and Bulgaria’s EU partners, can be alerted within minutes, without anything passing through an American company. The labor cost of setting this up and fixing the most basic weaknesses across the institutions would be about €650,000, plus about €300,000 a year for maintenance, with a European security firm on call. Over three years: about €1.3 million.

In both cases, the same Bulgarian staff at “Information Services” would do the watching, so their salaries are left out of both sums.

By our estimate, over three years, taxpayers will pay about €10 million for Google’s system, against about €1.3 million for a sovereign alternative doing the same job: nearly eight times as much. The alternative keeps the state’s security records inside the country, beyond the reach of the CLOUD Act. The simplest way to prove these estimates wrong is for the government to publish the contract.

Beyond Google

Bulgaria exposes, more sharply than most, the gap between Brussels’ talk of digital sovereignty and the reality on the ground. Bulgarian engineers work by the thousands for foreign companies, from Hewlett-Packard and Bosch to Japan’s Sega, and the country’s internet infrastructure is solid. Yet its government’s procurement decisions push the state ever deeper into dependence on Microsoft and Google.

In January 2026, it emerged that the Council of Ministers had authorized the e-Government Minister to launch a tender (обществена поръчка) for a new Microsoft contract, covering the entire state administration. Former e-Government Minister Bozhidar Bozhanov has warned the project would put every civil servant’s account in Microsoft’s cloud. Microsoft encrypts what it stores and sends, but by default it also holds the keys, and whatever Microsoft can unlock, the CLOUD Act can order it to be handed over to US state agencies.

Microsoft now offers governments the option of keeping a key of their own, which it cannot override, a change Bozhanov has called a step in the right direction. In April 2026, the government put the tender on hold and ordered an analysis first. Whether Bulgaria will use its own key, whether a contract will be signed, and for how much, has not been made public.

There is no Bulgarian equivalent of Germany’s STACKIT or France’s OVHcloud, no domestic alternative being built with serious money. Like most smaller EU states outside the French and German core, Bulgaria consumes the sovereignty debate rather than taking part in it.

There is one exception, and it is telling. INSAIT, an AI institute in Sofia, has built BgGPT, a chatbot that in Bulgarian outperforms models many times its size, including, in our own test, Claude. The National Revenue Agency already runs it on its own servers. The skill to build sovereign systems exists in Bulgaria; it is simply not used where it matters most.

Bulgaria’s ruling elite has amblyopia: there is no damage to the weaker eye, but the brain learns to ignore it and relies on the stronger one. As a result, depth is lost. The eye that watches Russia is sharp. The eye that would see an ally as a foreign power still works, but its signal has long been suppressed.

Sociologists have a name for the people who see this way: compradors, local elites whose position depends on a foreign power, and who come to see its interests as their country’s own. Bulgarians have an older word: chorbadzhii. A whole caste of people can play this role while sincerely believing they serve their country.

Beneath it all lies something simpler. Whether the power is over a customer on the phone or over a state’s defenses, it is used for the same reason: simply because it can be. No further rationale is needed. Where there is no transparency, none is ever asked for. The nature of the impulse is the same, but the damage grows with the scale of responsibility. Pontius Pilate told Jesus he had the power to free him or to crucify him. In Anatole France’s telling, years later, Pilate could no longer remember his name.

Japan / 日本(AI翻訳の手順付き)

日本語に翻訳するには:以下の指示文をAIチャットにコピーして送信してください(claude.ai がおすすめですが、ChatGPTやGeminiでも使えます)。次のメッセージで、読みたいセクションの本文を貼り付けてください。Introduction, What Is a Cloud?, Conclusion もあわせて読むことをおすすめします。

I will paste an opinion article. Translate it into Japanese in the plain essay style (である調), using the official Japanese names for people, laws and institutions. Keep the author’s voice and irony; do not soften, flatten or summarize. Do not editorialize or add nuances that are not present in the original.


Japan’s approach is practical: it is not trying to replace the American clouds in the ambitious way Gaia-X once intended, nor walling them out, as Russia does. It keeps the hyperscalers and vets them, while building a cloud of its own beside them.

The vetting is done through ISMAP, a security review a provider must pass before it can handle government data. Unlike the top level of Gaia-X, ISMAP does not require the provider to be Japanese. It checks how a cloud is run operationally, not who controls it, which leaves the CLOUD Act exactly as its lawmakers intended: a server in Tokyo, run by Japanese staff and certified by ISMAP, can still be reached by it.

Two factors have led Japan to this model of managed dependency:

The country’s military security already rests on an alliance with the United States rather than with its neighbors, which, at first glance, makes depending on American companies seem less risky. Prime Minister Takaichi’s commitment at her White House summit with President Trump, in March 2026, shows just how deep that dependency goes. Under the heading of defense cooperation, Japan pledged to build a “sovereign cloud platform” to improve information sharing with the United States. The word “sovereign” has been turned inside out: sovereign toward Washington, not from it. Allies’ interests do not always stay the same. Not even a century after Hiroshima, Japan’s most sensitive government data is being readied to potentially connect with the classified networks of the same state that, in August 2026, sanctioned the president of the International Criminal Court: the Japanese judge Tomoko Akane.

The other factor is the Japanese people’s historical bet on stability, which made the government a late arrival to the digital centralization of its services, compared with countries like Estonia and South Korea. Its Digital Agency was set up only in 2021, under pressure from the p^andemic. The aim was to connect government systems better, make them more secure and cut maintenance costs by 30%, replacing decades of patchwork. To do this, the Agency set up the government cloud (ガバメントクラウド): not a cloud of its own, but cloud services the Agency buys and prepares centrally for all levels of government, from approved providers, at first only the American hyperscalers.

Unfortunately, under the pressure of a crisis, the Agency allowed itself to be stampeded into decisions that benefit the hyperscalers, simply because they were ready to use. After all, even if it is not in the headlines, the Japanese remember their civil war, the Boshin Sensō, barely 160 years ago, as the price paid when reform lags.

A crisis, however, combined with bitter memories of history, is a poor time for hasty decisions whose effects will reverberate far into the future. When the lockdowns of 2020 sent offices, schools and governments online, the hyperscaler cloud business boomed, and with it the centralization of the world’s information and power in a handful of American companies, all within reach of the CLOUD Act—very convenient timing for them.

Had the new Digital Agency been patient and farsighted, and had it believed enough in Japan’s own potential, it could have pushed for a domestic cloud from the start, instead of taking the hyperscalers as the easy way out. Japan could have been on its way to digital independence within a few years. It would have been spared both the cost of moving to the hyperscalers and the cost of one day moving away from them to escape the CLOUD Act.

Even the promised savings from the initial hyperscaler move have not materialized—to the contrary: most of the participating local governments saw their running costs double; for one, they rose more than fivefold. Many had simply copied their old systems onto the cloud unchanged, then paid extra for new network lines and staff.

The bill is now due. By the government’s own estimate from 2026, the yearly running costs of the systems being moved will climb from 140 billion yen to 250 billion (an extra 730 million dollars a year), against a promised cut of 30%. The plan’s architect, Takuya Hirai, Japan’s first digital minister, lacked exactly those qualities of a statesman. He chose to make headlines instead, declaring a “digital defeat” in 2020, rushing the country into the hyperscalers’ arms. He has paid nothing for it and remains at the center of digital politics, steering the policies whose bill the taxpayers are paying.

The Sakura Cloud (さくらのクラウド)

The good news: only five years after founding its Digital Agency, Japan has a cloud of its own beside the American giants. In March 2026, Sakura Internet’s Sakura Cloud became the first Japanese cloud service fully certified for government work, after meeting all 305 of the government’s technical requirements.

Sakura Internet is an Osaka-based company that runs its own data centers in Tokyo, Osaka and, its flagship, Ishikari. The government’s own AI platform for civil servants, Gennai, is now trying out Japanese-built AI models from NTT Data, Fujitsu and Preferred Networks, running on Sakura’s cloud.

One weak spot remains: hardware. Chips are not reached by the CLOUD Act the way data is, but they come with a lever of their own: like Russia’s native cloud providers, Sakura buys its AI chips from the American Nvidia, whose exports Washington controls. Since 2023, Japan’s Ministry of Economy has approved 57 billion yen in subsidies toward them, as no Japanese AI chips exist. Yet.

Japan is working to break even this dependency: Sakura is only one piece of a larger plan for digital sovereignty. Its Ishikari data center, built to save on cooling in Hokkaido’s cold, is not far from the chip factory of Rapidus, a company that aims to supply Sakura and others with advanced AI chips. In April 2026, the government added another 632 billion yen to Rapidus’ funding, bringing state support to about 2.45 trillion yen, with mass production set to begin in 2027. Even then, Rapidus will only manufacture the chips; someone else has to design them, and design is the harder step.

Japan has taken the initiative there too: Preferred Networks, a Tokyo-based AI company backed by Japanese investors, designs its own chips. In January 2025, Preferred, Rapidus and Sakura teamed up: Preferred to design the chip, Rapidus to make it, Sakura to build the cloud services on it.

Despite the Digital Agency’s late start, this is no Meiji-era catch-up. Far from it. In only five years, Japan has gone from latecomer in digital centralization to one of the few democracies with a realistic path to running a national cloud on homegrown chips. Europe, for all its talk of Gaia-X, has ended up with “sovereign” labels on American clouds. Bulgaria, Google’s guinea pig, is at the opposite end of the spectrum: irresponsibly committing taxpayers to millions of euros, only to hand over its digital sovereignty to the hyperscalers.

Sakura is still small compared to the American giants, which are investing tens of billions of dollars in Japanese data centers. Government agencies are in no rush to leave the American clouds either: moving is costly and Sakura’s certification is only months old.

Microsoft and Sakura

Sakura’s independence now faces its first test. In April 2026, Microsoft announced that Sakura was exploring a partnership with it.

Under this proposal, Microsoft would rent the processing power of Sakura’s advanced AI chips, the same chips bought with the help of 57 billion yen in government subsidies meant to protect Japan’s digital sovereignty, and use it to sell its own cloud, Azure, to Japanese customers such as government agencies, banks and hospitals, who increasingly want their data to “stay in Japan”.

That is a promise about location. A marketing move. The CLOUD Act does not care about location. It reaches any data of which an American company has “possession, custody or control”. “Control” is the keyword; legally speaking, it simply means access. A cloud provider has many ways in. It can hold the encryption keys; push software updates, and an update can be written to copy data; let its engineers log in remotely for maintenance and support; give its administrators full rights over the whole system. If Microsoft holds any of these, a US court order to Microsoft can reach the data, and customers would legally be buying an American cloud. Amazon made the same move with its “European Sovereign Cloud”: local servers, local staff, EU rules, an American parent.

These decisive, seemingly technical details are not disclosed.

What does Microsoft gain? On the surface, processing power and the credibility of a Japanese partner. The real gain is not in the contract: market lock-in. Once a business moves its systems to a cloud, leaving is costly and risky, and few customers would realistically switch to a native Japanese provider when their contract ends. As part of its 10-billion-dollar package, Microsoft also plans to train one million Japanese engineers and developers by 2030, on its own technology: Azure, Copilot and GitHub Copilot. It sounds good for jobs, but for Japan’s digital sovereignty it is a Trojan horse: a million engineers trained on Azure would need retraining before they could build on Sakura or any other homegrown cloud. The companies that hire them will find it easier to stay with Microsoft, which keeps Microsoft’s market share safe from native providers like Sakura for decades, possibly forever.

The centralization of information and power that came with the American cloud boom now reaches for the one cloud Japan built for itself.

Prime Minister Takaichi has publicly praised the deal as important for “safeguarding data sovereignty”. Why would the government subsidize Sakura’s chips only to outsource its digital sovereignty in the end? Why not urge businesses and administrations to use Sakura’s own cloud? Could it be related to the defense commitments she made in Washington this year? Any politician likes to stand next to a record foreign investment with jobs and training programs.

Japan’s trade commitments to the US and the WTO limit how openly it can favor domestic digital companies. Subsidizing Sakura is allowed. Steering customers away from an American competitor is touchy. Washington’s trade office, the USTR, in its 2026 report on trade barriers, lists Japan’s subsidies, helping its own cloud companies buy AI chips, as a barrier to US trade, though the chips themselves are American. Such insolence! All the more reason to push back against a hyperscaler’s lock-in!

Takaichi may be building a good political career, but are these choices the best for Japan in the long run? If this deal goes through, it would repeat the mistake Hirai made when he first rushed governments into the hyperscalers.

Transparency

If Sakura held the encryption keys and left Microsoft no other way in, it would not have a care in the world about Microsoft’s legal obligations at home: even if compelled, Microsoft would have nothing to hand over. That is why “customer-held keys” are marketed so heavily as sovereignty solutions. Microsoft itself sells such a service, so the protection exists; whether this deal uses it is a choice. If the parties admitted Microsoft keeps access, the sovereignty marketing would collapse. If they admitted it is fully locked out, customers would ask why they need Microsoft at all.

US data requests often come with a gag order: a company can comply without the Japanese government, or the people whose data it is, ever finding out.

Nor does Japanese law require anyone to disclose who holds the keys. Its freedom of information law, the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs, passed in 1999 after a twenty-year citizens’ campaign, does not require anything to be published proactively. It is a request-based system: the burden to ask is on citizens, journalists and opposition lawmakers, and the agency must answer within 30 days, with exemptions such as national security, trade secrets or ongoing negotiations, any of which could be invoked here.

Most Japanese people still believe in their institutions, day to day, in a way few nations do anymore. That trust is exactly what this arrangement spends. Citizens owe authorities the truth, down to the smallest detail: almost every form ends with “true to the best of my knowledge”. The side effects of a medicine and the risks of a financial product must be disclosed, whether anyone asks or not. Who holds the keys to the government’s systems and its citizens’ data, and under which country’s law, sits behind a request only a specialist would know how to word, a 30-day wait, and a possible refusal.

This is not a government trying to keep up and falling behind. Logic points to intention. The same state runs one of the most sophisticated bureaucracies in the world, negotiates cloud sovereignty with Washington, and has a Digital Agency that reviews this exact infrastructure. It knows exactly what encryption key custody is. It knows exactly what the CLOUD Act does. So why not disclose who holds the keys? Forgot? A legal system perfectly capable of writing detailed disclosure rules for medicines and money has not written one for this.

Japan is building a cloud of its own with one hand while, with the other, preparing a platform to share its government data, and possibly its defense data, with Washington. Which hand wins is not yet decided. The Japanese public has every reason to take pride in what the country has built in five years, and every reason to keep watch, insisting that legislative decisions and business deals tip the balance toward a cloud that answers only to Japan.

The Digital Agency and Sakura Internet were asked for comment on November 4, 2026. Sakura Internet replied on November 9 that the joint solution with Microsoft is still under consideration and that it could not provide further details at this time. The Digital Agency’s response will be added here if received.

Conclusion: Who Holds the Keys?

Encryption keys decide who can read the data. There is a second, larger set of keys: control over the cloud environment itself. Engineers call it the “control plane”: the management layer through which every account, every server and every update is run. Whoever holds it can create and delete accounts, push changes and switch services on and off, for every customer at once. That is the provider.

So what are certifications and contracts worth? They are meaningful operational safeguards: they make casual, unauthorized access genuinely harder. They are not a legal shield against a lawful US court order aimed at the parent company. If the two ever clashed, the provider’s legal exposure at home would very likely outweigh its business abroad.

Why don’t the hyperscalers then, with all their money, fight the CLOUD Act? Fighting it would set them against the US government and its security agencies. Selling “sovereign” versions of their clouds is easier and more profitable. That’s having your cake and eating it too.

Few governments have told them no. South Korea is one: by law, its government bodies may only buy cloud services that pass its own certification, CSAP, and no foreign provider has passed the middle or higher tier. Washington’s trade office lists these rules as a “trade barrier”, as it does Japan’s chip subsidies. Gaia-X keeps American companies out of its top level too, but its label is voluntary, and no European government is required to buy only top-level services. Korea enforces; Europe labels. Even so, Korea’s sovereignty stops at the state: AWS and Microsoft hold over 80% of its private market. The state is sovereign; its citizens are not.

The CLOUD Act, with its court orders, is only the slow lever. The fast one is the control plane: no court, no decryption needed. In October 2019, following an executive order by President Trump, Adobe announced it would deactivate every user account in Venezuela, with no refunds: a whole country’s designers, publishers and students were to lose their tools. In July 2025, after the European Union sanctioned Nayara Energy, an Indian oil refiner part-owned by the Russian Rosneft, Microsoft suspended the company’s email and online meeting software overnight. No court had ordered either.

AI raises the stakes further, because everything in this series increasingly runs on it. Cutting off a tool, as Adobe and Microsoft did, at least gets noticed. AI can be changed instead: an update from the provider, or an export rule from Washington, can quietly shift what a ministry’s analysis or a hospital’s diagnosis concludes, often without anyone noticing.

Nothing forbids this. On land, there are rules about who commands what: constitutions, chains of command, international law. In the cloud, there are almost none. No treaty decides whose orders a cloud provider must follow when two governments disagree; the CLOUD Act and the GDPR simply contradict each other. Even the first binding treaty on AI, the Council of Europe’s convention of 2024, says nothing about who controls the infrastructure underneath.

Meanwhile, even land registries, court records and national archives are moving into clouds, most often an American hyperscaler’s. Estonia is an exception: it keeps a copy of its state in a “data embassy” in Luxembourg, a server room with the legal protection of an embassy, so that the state can carry on even if its territory is occupied.

Every government in this series is navigating this absence of rules, with varying degrees of honesty. The public, meanwhile, is shut out of the conversation, just as literacy in the Middle Ages was reserved for the clergy.

The remedy is not mysterious:

  1. A mandatory “cloud nutrition label”, stating publicly who holds the keys and under which country’s law.
  2. Public education, for adults as well as children, on the basics covered in this series. What is a cloud? What is lock-in? How does the CLOUD Act reach everyone through the American tech giants? What protections exist beyond operational ones? Not just how to copy-paste and use Google! An uninformed public lets the economically and politically powerful decide unchecked.
  3. Finally, separate business from the state, as church and state were once separated. In 1868, Japan separated Buddhism from kami worship, Shinbutsu bunri, to strengthen the new central state, at great cost to its spiritual tradition. A separation that protects the state should be easier. The idea is not radical even in America. In 1811, the legislature of New York, which would become the world capital of finance, passed the Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing Purposes: a corporation could exist for one specific purpose, for twenty years at most, with no more than 100,000 dollars in capital—a share of the economy equal to some three billion dollars today.

Whether states needed to move their records and systems into The Cloud at all is a question for another story; peaceful communities lived for thousands of years without one. The move has happened, and lock-in has made it hard to undo.

For the first time in history, power is centralizing on a global scale, and passing from people to the systems themselves. Who holds it and who answers for how it is used, is the oldest question there is. Humanity has fought for centuries over who rules the land, and arguably has not finished. The same question is now being asked of The Cloud, faster and with fewer rules. Humanity is being stress-tested.


Wabino: concept, argument, writing, final edit, vis dev
Claude (AI): research, fact-checking, structural and editorial suggestions

Sources: here

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